NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 57 | Number 2

Article 4

2-1-1979

Federalism in the Coastal Zone: Three Models of
State Jurisdiction and Control
Thomas J. Schoenbaum
Frank Parker Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Frank Parker Jr., Federalism in the Coastal Zone: Three Models of State Jurisdiction and Control, 57 N.C. L. Rev.
231 (1979).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol57/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

FEDERALISM IN THE COASTAL ZONE:
THREE MODELS OF STATE JURISDICTION
AND CONTROL
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUMt

FRANK PARKER, JR.t

In the last decade both the government and the public have come
to recognize fully the great importance of the nation's coastal and
marine resources. A major result of this realization has been a vastly
increased federal role in coastal and offshore areas, illustrated by federal legislation in the principal substantive areas of coastal zone lands
and waters, 1 coastal fisheries,2 marine mammals,3 marine pollution and
ocean dumping,4 outer continental shelf oil, gas and mineral resources, 5 and deep water port development.6 This spate of federal activity and assertion of jurisdiction might lead one to assume that the
power of the states over coastal resources has radically diminished and
that federalism in this context is dead. The thesis of this article is that,
paradoxically, new avenues of state assertion of authority have opened
and federalism is alive and well in the coastal zone. The states must
act, however, to take full advantage of the new opportunities that are
presented; a default by the states of their responsibilities will result in
unnecessary abdication to federal control.
The purpose of this article is to provide a guide through the maze
of problems relating to federal-state authority in order to show how a
coastal state may maximize its role in the management of coastal and
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1. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
2. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).
3. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976).
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offshore resources. Three principal models of state jurisdiction and
control are distinguished and analyzed. First, a coastal state may exercise its authority directly through a grant of power under federal law.
Second, state power may be asserted by virtue of a right to control federal activities in the coastal area. Third, coastal state police power may
be exercised within the framework of federal law.
I.

FEDERAL GRANTS OF AUTHORITY TO THE STATES

Under the United States Constitution, the federal government's
authority over coastal and marine resources is clearly paramount. In
United States v. California,7 the Supreme Court held that the ownership, control and protection of the three mile belt beyond the low water
mark is a function of national sovereignty. In addition, Congress has
broad powers to enact legislation affecting these resources because of
its delegated powers, especially under the commerce clause of the Constitution. But Congress has chosen to exercise this power in certain
instances by making direct grants of power to the states under federal
law. This pattern of federalism is evident in two principal subject
areas: outer continental shelf resources and water pollution control.
A.

Outer ContinentalShelf Resources

In 1953 Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, which ceded
to coastal states title to the resources and lands beneath the navigable
waters within their boundaries.' The delimitation of the baseline and
the seaward boundary of this grant kept the United States Supreme
Court busy for the next twenty-five years, but it is now clear that the
limit of state coastal jurisdiction is three geographical miles, except in
the case of Texas and Florida, which enjoy proprietory rights in the
Gulf of Mexico extending three marine leagues (nine geographical
miles).10 Although power over navigation, commerce and international
7. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. Ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1970)).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S.
121 (1960). In the case of the Great Lakes States, state coastal jurisdiction extends to the international boundary. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976).
As indicated in the text, the Submerged Lands Act has generated more than its share of
controversy. Part of the problem has been that the Act does not specify how a state's baseline
should be drawn, nor which bodies of water may qualify as "inland waters." These questions
were partially resolved in United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965), in which the Supreme
Court adopted, for purposes of the Act, definitions employed by the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
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affairs was specifically retained by the United States, the grant to the

states is quite broad, including the mineral, fishery and plant resources
of the seabed and water column.1
In 1976, when Congress passed the Fishery Conservation and

Management Act, which extended fisheries management jurisdiction to
200 miles seaward of the coastal baseline, state control over the fishery

within the three mile zone was retained.'" Thus states will continue to
manage fisheries in the territorial sea subject to constitutional restraints,' 3 preemption by inconsistent federal law,' 4 and the possibility
of federal override of state jurisdiction by the Secretary of Commerce
in the case of fish stocks found predominantly within the 197 mile zone

seaward of state jurisdiction. 5

Furthermore, the United States

Supreme Court, in Douglas v. Seacoast Products,Inc., 16 held that, de-

spite the language of the Submerged Lands Act, 17 the doctrine that a
state "owns" wildlife resources within its boundary may not be taken
literally; nonetheless, this doctrine does grant a state special
power to
8
preserve and regulate the exploitation of these resources.'
Even beyond the three mile band of state jurisdiction, within the
205. But policy and definitional problems continue to arise. See, e.g., United States v. California,
98 S. Ct. 1662 (1978) (dominion over submerged lands and waters surrounding Channel Islands
National Monument belongs to California); United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975) (definition of "historic bay"); United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975) (transfer of rights to states by
Submerged Lands Act in no way repudiates basic national sovereignty over offshore seabed).
11. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1970).
12. Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 306, 90 Stat. 355 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1976)).
13. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (state statute requiring nonresidents to
pay $2,500 fishing license fee and residents only $25 violated privileges and immunities clause of
Constitution).
14. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (Virginia statutes discriminating against nonresident and alien fishermen preempted by federal statutes governing enrollment and licensing of foreign vessels). See generally Schoenbaum & McDonald, State
Management of Marine Fisheriesafter the Fishery Conservationand ManagementAct of 1976 and
Douglas v. Seacoast Products Inc., 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 17 (1977).
15. Section 306(b) of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act provides that the Secretary of Commerce may regulate a fishery within state territorial waters in cases in which the state's
acts or omissions "substantially and adversely affect" fishery management in the federal 197 mile
zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b) (1976). No override is possible, however, when the fishery in question
operates predominantly within state waters. Whether this exception should be corrected by additional legislation is a subject of current debate. See, e.g., S. 2265, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.
REc. S.18,244 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1977), providing for direct federal regulation of fisheries in state
territorial and internal waters.
16. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
17. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970).
18. 431 U.S. at 284. See also Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978), which
held that the efforts of Montana to allocate access to "recreational" hunting through a differential
licensing scheme were "rationally" related to the state's substantial interest in the preservation of
finite resources and violated neither the equal protection clause nor the privileges and immunities
clause of the Constitution.
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area of the outer continental shelf under federal control, the states may
exercise substantial power and influence. Under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act,' 9 the civil and criminal laws of the United States,
including laws of the adjacent states, are extended to the subsoil, seabed, artificial islands and fixed structures, to the limit of federal jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf. In Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty
Co.,20 the United States Supreme Court relied on this provision to hold
that Louisiana state law was applicable in an action for wrongful death
brought by the families of two men killed on a drilling rig located on
the continental shelf more than three miles from the Louisiana coast.
The Court reasoned that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act adopts
adjacent state law as "surrogate federal law" whenever it has not been
supplanted by inconsistent federal law or regulation. The relevant state
law is to be applied by federal authorities and is enforceable in the
federal courts as if the areas in question were federal enclaves in a
landlocked state. 21 The implications of this doctrine have not generally
been recognized by coastal states: since many areas of law are not addressed by federal legislation, the bulk of state law would not be
preempted.22
Another mechanism for the exercise of federalism in the area of
the outer continental shelf that is beyond state jurisdiction is found
when the states are given shared power of decisionmaking under applicable federal law. Under the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974,23 which
provides a framework for licensing construction of deepwater ports beyond the three mile zone, adjacent coastal states are given the power to
veto a decision by the Secretary of Transportation to issue a license for
19. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970).

20. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
21. The Court concluded that federal admiralty jurisdiction is not applicable to artificial islands or drilling structures on the continental shelf. Id. at 360-61, 363, 366. Section 19 of the

Deepwater Ports Act, which provides that state law shall apply to deepwater ports "to the extent
applicable and not inconsistent with" federal laws and regulations, also embraces this concept.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1518 (1970).
22. State implementation plans to control emissions ofpollutants under the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1977), would be enforceable by federal authorities under this
theory. House and Senate Conferees working on proposed amendments to the Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act have agreed upon language that would require the Secretary of the Interior to
promulgate regulations for Outer Continental Shelf compliance with Air Act standards, but not
the statutory requirements. [1978] ENvw.. REP. (BNA) Current Devs. 310 (June 23, 1978). The
Environmental Protection Agency has recently determined that Exxon Corporation's proposed

installation of an offshore storage and treatment facility on the outer continental shelf off the coast
of Santa Barbara County, California, is subject to Clean Air Act requirements. 43 Fed. Reg.

16,393 (1978).
23. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976).
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such a port.24 Other instances of federal grants of shared decisionmaking are less far-reaching. For example, under the Fishery Conservation

and Management Act of 1976,25 state participation in the formulation
of fisheries management plans in the 197 mile Federal Fishery Conservation Zone is assured through state representation on the regional
councils created by the Act, but the Secretary of Commerce has final

approval power over the management plans.26
A major issue has been the extent of state participation in decisions by the Secretary of the Interior to lease and to permit develop-

ment and production of the oil and gas resources of the outer
continental shelf beyond state jurisdiction. The Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act is devoid of any mechanism for shared state decisionmaking, and participation by the states has been only through informal
advisory committees created by the Secretary of the Interior.27 Several

states have sought unsuccessfully to assert a veto power over lease sales
28
by bringing suit under the National Environmental Policy Act. Al-

though injunctions of lease sales were granted in several instances by
lower federal courts, all were ultimately reversed on appeal. 29 Recent

amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act do formalize a
procedure of federal consultation with affected states regarding the size,
timing, or location of proposed development and production plans, but
the states essentially remain in an advisory role.30
24. Id. § 1508. An analogous veto provision is contained in title III of the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1976), which provides that the
governor of a state may veto the proposed designation of a federal marine sanctuary that would
embrace waters within the state's three mile limit. 16 U.S.C. § 1432(b) (1976).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).
26. Id. §§ 1852(b)(1), 1854(a).
27. Rules and regulations pertaining to advisory committees utilized by the Department of
the Interior may be found at 43 C.F.R. § 1784 (1976). For a general critique of the issue of state

participation in outer continental shelf resource development, see Breeden, Federalism and the
Development of Outer ContinentalShefMineralResources, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1107 (1976).

28. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). NEPA requires preparation of a detailed environmental impact statement for any "major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.' Id. § 4332(2)(C). An impact statement for a lease sale could be challenged on the sufficiency of its anticipation of the range and
magnitude of the onshore and offshore impacts of the project.
29. E.g., County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S.Ct. 1238 (1978). The district court found fatal deficiencies in the environmental
impact statement for lease sales in the Baltimore Canyon, 76 F.R.D. 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), but the
court of appeals reversed, principally on grounds of error in the assessment of the materiality of
the NEPA violations. Cf.Alaska v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding
lease sale impact deficiencies but refusing to invalidate sales on grounds of NEPA violation). But
see Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138 (D. Mass. 1978), appealdocketed,Nos. 781036, -1037 (1st Cir. Jan. 28, 1978) (citing impact statement inadequacies in decision to enjoin
Secretary of Interior from proceeding with lease sales in Georges Bank area).
30. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, S.9, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
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Water Pollution ControlActivities in the CoastalZone

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)31 has long
recognized the basic responsibility of the states for the control of water
quality within their jurisdictions. States are granted the authority
under this Act for waste treatment facilities and area-wide waste man-

agement,32 to adopt water quality standards subject to the approval of
the Environmental Protection Agency, 33 and to apply for and receive
approval to administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System for enforcing effluent limitations and water quality standards.

4

The section 404 permit program 35 of the FWPCA was a significant
exception to this pattern of broad delegation of federal authority to the

states. This program was created as a result of a court decree 36 accepting the argument of environmentalists that the term "navigable waters" in the FWPCA3 7 referred not just to bodies of water that were
historically used for navigation or were capable by artificial means of
being made navigable, but referred, in accordance with the literal language of the Act, to all "waters of the United States." 3 8 This expanded
definition of navigable waters effectively extended the jurisdiction of
the FWPCA to include mangrove wetland areas above mean high
tide 39 and coastal wetland areas characterized by brackish-water-dependent vegetation, even though they might be inundated by the tides
124 CONG. REC. S.13,998 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1978), was given final approval by the House, 124
CONG. REc. H.8883 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1978), and the Senate, id. at S.13,998 (daily ed. Aug. 22,
1978), and was signed into law September 18, 1978. The amendments do much to increase the
level of state particpationin federal leasing decisions, while clearly giving the federal government
primary responsibility for minimizing or eliminating conflicts between exploitation of outer continental shelf oil and gas reserves and other uses of the marine environment. See generally H.R.
REP. No. 1474, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. REP. No. 1091, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
31. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West Supp. 1977).
32. Id. §§ 1281, 1288.
33. Id. § 1313.
34. Id. § 1342.
35. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86
Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1977)).
36. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
37. The FWPCA defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7) (West Supp. 1977).
38. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.
1975).
39. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). "Mean-high tide" or
"mean-high water" is ascertained by fixing the average height of all the high tides at a given
location over a period of 18.6 years. See United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448, 450 (1966);
Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26, 27 (1935).
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only a few times a year.n' The Corps of Engineers promulgated regulations establishing the section 404 permit program under the FWPCA
and directly regulating dredging and filling activities in coastal
wetlands.4 '
Many criticized this program as an undue assertion of federal authority, and as a result of this criticism, Congress amended the FWPCA
in 1977 to provide for possible delegation of the administration of the
program to the states. 42 The delegation procedure requires the governor of the state to submit an application for the right to administer the
permit program to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), accompanied by a statement of the state attorney general that the state has adequate legal authority to administer the program.43 The application will be approved if the state program satisfies
the substantive requirements of federal law;" thereafter, the federal
permit program is suspended. 45 The EPA Administrator retains the
power to object to and hold a hearing on any individual permit application 46 and can even withdraw his approval of the state program if it is
determined after a public hearing that the program is not being administered within federal requirements.47
Despite the necessity to adhere rigidly to federal standards, it
would appear to be in coastal states' interests to gain approval to administer section 404 as an integral part of the coastal zone management. Most states with operative coastal zone management programs
will want to eliminate the duplication and possible conflict involved in
a federally run section 404 program. This delegation procedure leaves
intact much of the federal authority now exercised in coastal waters.
The section 10 authority exercised by the Corps of Engineers under the
Rivers and Harbors Act, 48 which extends to mean-high tide in tidal
40. Conservation Council v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.N.C.), afl'd, 528 F.2d 250 (4th
Cir. 1975).
41. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (1977) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.1-.5); see Comment,
Corps of Engineers PromulgatesRevised Dredge and FillRegulations, 7 ENViR. L. REP. 10193

(1977).
42. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, § 67(b), 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §

1344(g) (West Supp. 1977)).
43. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(g) (West Supp. 1977).
44. Id. §§ 1317, 1318, 1343.
45. Id. § 1344(h)(2)(A).

46. Id. § 13440).
47. Id. § 1344(i).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
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areas and mean-high water of traditionally navigable rivers, is unaffected by the delegation.4 9 Furthermore, the state is given no jurisdiction under section 404 over either federal projects specifically
authorized by Congress5" or the Corps of Engineers' dredging activities
to maintain navigation.51
II.

STATE CONTROL OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES:
"CONSISTENCY" DETERMINATIONS

The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA)52 creates a
federal grant program to enable coastal states and territories to develop
and implement comprehensive management programs for their coastal
53
areas. States may receive up to four program development grants,
and, once the Secretary of Commerce approves the state program, federal money is available for its administration. 54 Another provision of
the CZMA provides matching federal funds for the acquisition and operation of estuarine sanctuaries, beach access, and island preservation.5 In order to mitigate the impact on coastal states of outer
continental shelf energy development, a Coastal Energy Impact Fund
(CEIF) makes available loans and grants to anticipate the consequence
of offshore energy development, to provide for the mitigation of damage to environmental and recreational resources, and to finance the
56
new public services necessary to accommodate energy development.
The CZMA is more than a grant program; it offers the unprecedented inducement to coastal states that upon federal approval of their
49. State authority under a delegated § 404 permit program extends only to nonnavigable
waters and salt and freshwaters above the mean-high water mark. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(g)(1) (West

Supp. 1977).
50. A federal project specifically authorized by Congress is exempt from § 404 regulation if

the environmental impact statement for the project has addressed the probable effects of dredgeand-fill activities and the statement has been submitted to Congress prior to project authorization.
Id. § 1344(r).
51. Section 404 "shall not be construed as affecting or impairing the authority of the Secre-

tary to maintain navigation." Id. § 1344(t). This section appears to preserve the sense of the
holding in State v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977), that

the delegation to a state of § 402 permit authority gave the state no added control over Corps of
Engineer dredging activities. As with any federal agency, however, the Corps is otherwise subject

to state water pollution requirements. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1323 (West Supp. 1977). Further, the Corps'
own regulations provide for state review of dredging activities. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 209.145(0(1)

(1977).
52. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
53. Id. § 1454.
54. Id. § 1455.
55. Id.§ 1461.
56. Id.§ 1456(a).
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coastal zone management programs, federal actions within or affecting
their coastal zones will be conducted in a manner "consistent" with the
states' programs.5 7 Four distinct categories of federal agency action are
made subject to the consistency requirement: (1) conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone; (2) development
projects in the coastal zone; (3) licensing and permitting activities in the
coastal zone; and (4) approval of local and state government assistance
programs.58
Several factors diminish the reality of state control despite the consistency requirements. First, although the touchstone of federal consistency is a state's own coastal zone management plan, the contours of
that plan itself are initially shaped by federal requirements. A state
program may not be approved by the Secretary of Commerce if the
views of federal agencies "principally affected by such programs" do
not appear to have been "adequately considered. '5 9 Although these
requirements can be read to give federal agencies a significant amount
of leverage over the policy choices incorporated into a state's plan, their
intent is to 6stablish a reciprocal state-federal consultative relationship
early in the program development process. A trade-off is implied--"in
exchange for providing relevant Federal agencies with the opportunity
for full participation during program development and for adequately
considering the views of such agencies, States can effectuate the Federal consistency provisions."" The general "inadequa[cy]" of a state's
consideration of federal agency views is evaluated in light of the "reasonableness" of the state's response." It is clear, however, that a state
is not required to accommodate every federal agency comment; it is
sufficient to provide for federal input, to respond to comments received
and, "where appropriate in the opinion of the State," to incorporate the
substance of relevant federal commentary into the body of the management program.62
Second, a state's management plan must give "adequate consideration of the national interest" in planning for the siting of facilities
(including energy facilities) that are necessary to meet other than local
57. Id. § 1456(c)(1). See also id. § 1456(a).
58. Id. §§ 1456(c)(1)-(3), (d).
59. Id. § 1456(b).
60. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Interim Final Regulations on the
Development and Approval of Coastal Zone Management Programs, 43 Fed. Reg. 8,378, 8,413
(1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 923.51).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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requirements.63 The management program must also include a planning process for energy facilities likely to be located in the coastal
zone. 64 A state thus may not arbitrarily fail to balance national concerns with the state and local interest in protecting against adverse social and environmental impacts.65
Third, a major qualification to the consistency requirements is section 304(1) of the CZMA, which specifically excludes from the definition of coastal zone "lands the use of which is by law subject solely to
the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government,
its officers, or agents."' 66 The federal government holds public lands
under four different types of jurisdiction: (a) exclusive jurisdiction over
federal enclaves under article I of the United States Constitution; 67 (b)
concurrent jurisdiction over article I property partially ceded to federal
control by a state;68 (c) "proprietary" jurisdiction pursuant to the property clause, article IV of the United States Constitution; 69 and (d) trust
jurisdiction over Indian lands. 70 About ninety-five percent of public
lands are held by the federal government in its article IV proprietary
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(8) (1976).
64. Id. § 1454(b)(8).

65. Although these sections arguably can be read to support an affirmative duty on the part
of a state to provide for the siting of new energy facilities in the coastal zone, at least one court has
recently rejected the contention that a demonstrable affirmative accommodation of energy facilities is a prerequisite to state plan approval. In American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, No. 77-3375RJK (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1978), a federal district court upheld the Department of Commerce's
approval of the California Coastal Zone Management Plan against an industry challenge based
upon the alleged insufficiency of the plan to provide for the "national interest" in energy development. The court ruled that the CZMA is primarily directed to environmental concerns and that
the nation's interest in energy is to be balanced with, rather than placed above, the national environmental interests addressed by the Act. See [1978] ENvIR. REP. (BNA) Current Devs. 909
(Sept. 15, 1978). Similar challenges by the petroleum lobby to the Massachusetts and Wisconsin
programs were dismissed for lack of ripeness and standing. See American Petroleum Inst. v.
Knecht, Nos. 78-623, 78-684 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 6, 1978).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1976).
17, provides that Congress shall have power
67. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever over such District.. .as may
..become the Seat of the Government of the United States' and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other
needful Buildings.
68. This jurisdiction operates when the land has been acquired by cession or consent of the
state but the state retains certain jurisdiction and authority. In general, such a reservation is permitted for so long as it does "not operate to deprive the United States of the enjoyment of the
property for the purposes for which it was acquired." James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S.
134, 149 (1937) (land purchased with state consent); accord,Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114
U.S. 525 (1885) (land acquired by state cession).
69. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cL 2, provides: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States. .

....

70. Indian lands have been held to be owned by the United States in trust for the Indian
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capacity.7 1 Although it has been argued that the article IV property

power was not originally conceived to encompass a general federal
government jurisdiction over public lands within a state,72 the United
States Supreme Court recently stated in Kleppe v. New Mexico 73 that
"Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature
over the public domain"'74 article IV property. Relying on an earlier

case7 ' and this statement in Kleppe, a United States Department of Justice advisory opinion contends that, although the state may regulate
some private activities on federal lands in cases of nonexclusive federal
jurisdiction, the federal use of such lands is in no way subject to state
regulation. Since federal use is unimpaired by state control, it is "subject solely to the discretion" of the federal government; thus section
304(1) of the CZMA operates to exclude all federal lands from the defi-

nition of "coastal zone" and from the consistency requirements. 76 Regulations issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) have adopted this theory of total exclusion of
federal lands, with the important qualification that federal activities on
such lands are subject to the consistency requirements if they produce
spillover impacts that "significantly affect" nonfederal areas.7 7
tribes or for individual Indians. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 245 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1917) (in
trust for tribe); United States v. Bowling, 256 U.S. 484, 486-87 (1921) (in trust for individual).
71. U.S. PUBLIC LAND REVIEW COMMISSION, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION STUDY,
REPORT No. 1, at 163-64 (1969).
72. See Engdahl, State andFederalPower O'er FederalProperty,18 ARIz. L. REv. 283, 296
(1976).
73. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
74. Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
75. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917). The Court in dictum said
that state laws do not apply to article IV lands except "as they may have been adopted or made
applicable by Congress." Id. at 405.
76. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Lands Exclusion of the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972 (August 10, 1976) (opinion of Assistant Att'y Gen.) (copy on file with authors).
The Department of Justice's conclusion may be vulnerable to at least two arguments. First, it
may be contended that use of the word "solely" in § 304(a) indicates that Congress intended the
exclusion to apply only to the federal enclave lands subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. This
contention, however, is weakened by a statement in the Act's legislative history that the consistency requirements do not extend state authority "to land subject solely to the discretion of the
Federal Government such as national parks, forests and wildlife refuges, Indian reservations and
defense establishments." S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4776, 4783.
Second, it may be argued on constitutional grounds that despite Kieppe'r dictum, see text
accompanying note 74 -upra,the constitutional property clause power has not traditionally been
held to be capable per se of preempting state laws. For a discussion of the "preemptive capability" of article IV in classic property clause doctrine, see Engdahl, supra note 72.
77. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Interim Final Regulations on the
Development and Approval of Coastal Zone Management Programs, 43 Fed. Reg. 8,378, 8,405
(1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 923.33).
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A. Consistency of FederalActivitiesand Development Projects.CZMA Sections 307(c)(1) and (2)
Section 307(c)(1) 78 requires that all federal agency activities "directly affecting the coastal zone" be conducted in a manner consistent
"to the maximum extent practicable" with approved state management
programs. Section 307(c)(2)1 9 contains a similar provision on federal
development projects "in the coastal zone." As a preliminary matter, it
should be noted that the language employed throughout section 307 is
not uniform. In addition to the terms just quoted, section
307(c)(3)(A) ° uses the term "affecting land or water uses"; section
307(c)(3)(B) 1 mentions outer continental shelf activities "affecting any
land use or water use"; section 307(d)12 addresses federal assistance activities "affecting the coastal zone." Neither the Act nor its legislative
history give any guidance concerning the substantive differences, if
any, in the definitions of these terms. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) takes the position that uniformity
is necessary and has applied the single definition of "significantly affecting the coastal zone" to all these sections. Thus, federal action described in subsections 307(c) and (d) will trigger the appropriate
consistency compliance requirement if it causes significant changes in
the use and quality of coastal zone resources or results in significant
limitations on the range of resource uses. The provision casts a wide
net; a federal action that causes such changes or limitations will meet
even when the cumulative effects are
the "significantly affecting"8 test
3
beneficial.
be
to
determined
NOAA regulations provide that the federal agencies, not the state
government, determine which federal activities "significantly affect" a
state's coastal areas and are consequently subject to consistency review.84 The state, however, can ensure a certain amount of input at this
stage by incorporating into its management program a list of federal
activities that, in the opinion of the state, are likely to "significantly
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1976).
79. Id. § 1456(c)(2).
80. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A).

81. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(B).
82. Id. § 1456(d).
83. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Federal Consistency with Approved
Coastal Management Programs, 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,518 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R§
930.10-.145).
84. Id. at 10,520 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.33(b)).
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affect" the coastal zone.8" Although federal agencies are not obligated
to afford consistency review to all activities identified on a state list or
through case-by-case monitoring, if a federal agency does decide that a
consistency determination is not required for a listed or identified activity, it must notify the state of the reasons for its negative determination
at least ninety days before final approval of the activity. 6 The state
thus has an opportunity to review borderline cases and, in the case
of a serious disagreement, to seek mediation by the Secretary of
Commerce.87
Once an activity or development project is determined to "significantly affect" the coastal zone, the responsible federal agency must provide the state with a consistency determination. It may do so in any
manner it chooses (although agencies are encouraged to use existing
notification procedures such as the National Environmental Policy Act
process) as long as state agencies receive the information at least ninety
days before the final approval of the activity or project. 88 The determination is to detail whether the project or activity, its primary effects (for
example, air, water and waste discharges), and its associated facilities
(such as access roads and connecting pipelines) will be consistent "to
the maximum extent practicable" with the "enforceable, mandatory
policies" of the management program. 9 State agencies then have
forty-five days from receipt of the federal notification to provide a response. In no case may final federal action be taken on the activity or
project sooner than ninety days from the issuance of the consistency
determination. 90
If the state disagrees with the federal agency's determination of
consistency, it should notify the agency of the basis of its disagreement
and what alternate measures might be adopted by the federal agency to
ensure consistency. If the disagreement is "serious," either party may
invoke CZMA's secretarial mediation provision. 91 As implemented in
the regulations, the mediation process is entirely voluntary; either party
may decline to participate in the first phase, may withdraw at any time,
85. Id.
86. Id. at 10,521 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.3(d)).
87. Either the state or a federal agency may seek mediation in the event of a "serious disagreement... regarding a determination related to whether proposed activity significantly affects
the coastal zone." Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.36). Secretarial mediation is discussed in
text accompanying note 91 infra.

88.
89.
90.
91.

43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,520 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.34).
Id. at 10,522 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(a)).
Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.41).
16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1976).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

and is under no compulsion to come to a resolution.92 Although the
mediation procedure does allow the Secretary to attempt to persuade
the parties to resolve disagreement, there is no guarantee that will be
the outcome. Significantly for the states, in the event of a continuing
state-federal disagreement regarding the consistency of a particular activity or project, the commentary to the regulations makes it clear that
federal agencies are free to proceed after the ninety-day period has expired.93 Although NOAA "encourages" federal agencies to suspend
of a disagreement, the
implementation of a decision pending resolution
94
suspension."
.
.
.
mandate
not
Act "does
Subsections 307(c)(1) and (2) thus appear to provide the states
with little more than an opportunity to react to federal consistency determinations for activities and projects. This idea is also implicit in the
treatment in the regulations of consistency determinations for activities
initiated prior to a state's management program approval. Although
the consistency provisions on the whole are generally prospective in
force, requiring federal compliance with state management policies for
actions begun after inception of the state's program, the regulations do
require consistency review for those activities and projects initiated
prior to program approval that can be reassessed, modified, or completed in major phases. 95 This provision, however, does not apply to
phased federal decisions that have already been "described, considered,
and approved" prior to state program implementation, such as in a
final National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) environmental impact statement.96
The key to the degree of consistency required lies buried in the
statutory directive "to the maximum extent practicable." NOAA has
construed this phrase in light of the Act's "saving clause," section
307(e),97 which provides that the CZMA is not intended either to diminish federal or state jurisdiction and responsibilities or to modify existing laws applicable to federal agencies. The resulting interpretation
is that "consistency" means consistent to the fullest degree permitted by
existing law.98 Furthermore, the regulations permit a federal agency to
deviate from "full consistency" in cases of "unforeseen circumstances"
92. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,530-31 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.112-.115).
93. Id. at 10,523 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930A2, Comment).

94.

Id. at 10,513.

95. Id. at 10,521-22 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.38).
96. Id. at 10,522 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.38(b)).

97. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(e) (1976).
98. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,519 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(a) & Comment).
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that present a "substantial obstacle" to complete adherence to the management program. 99

Although these provisions could be used by federal agencies as a
ready means to avoid the consistency requirements, they are probably
not the serious loopholes they appear to be at first glance. First, if a
federal agency asserts that consistency compliance in a given case is
legally prohibited, it must clearly set forth the statutory provisions, legislative history, or other legal authority upon which it relies. 1°° This
requirement indicates that NOAA does not intend to tolerate casual
abuse of the "legally impracticable" defense, and the provision at least
guarantees the state a record on which to seek mediation or even judicial review. Second, comments to the regulations make it clear that
deviations are expected to occur only in exceptional cases of serious
"unforeseen" circumstances.10 1 Such circumstances would tend to arise
only when there is a substantial lack of communication between the
state and federal agencies, or when either side is seriously deficient in
its planning capabilities. Since the practical thrust of the entire CZMA
is to encourage federal-state cooperation and consultation in the planning process, 112 these situations are likely to be infrequent.
B. Consistency.for Activities Requiring a FederalLicense or Permit
CZMA Section 307(c)(3)(A)
In contrast to the relatively weak consistency review opportunities
given to the states by sections 307(c)(1) and (2), CZMA section
307(c)(3)(A)10 3 provides the states with a limited veto power over the
issuance of federal licenses and permits. The provision requires that
"any applicant" for a federal "license or permit" to conduct an activity
affecting "land and water uses" in the coastal zone must certify to the
state that the proposed activity will be consistent with the state's approved program. If the state objects to the certification within six
months of its receipt, no permit or license may be issued unless the
Secretary of Commerce overrides the state's objection on the grounds
that the activity is "consistent with the objectives" of the Act or "is
otherwise necessary in the interest of national security." 1 4
99. Id. at 10,520 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(b)).
100. Id. at 10,519 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(a)).
101. Id. at 10,520 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(b), Comment).
102. See, ag, S.REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4776, 4783.
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1970).
104. Id.

NORTH CAROLINA L,4WREVIEW

[Vol. 57

The regulations make it clear in this case that it is the state, rather
than federal agencies, that determines what license and permit activities require consistency certification.10 5 State agencies are required to
include in their management program a listing of license and permit
categories that are likely to "significantly affect" the coastal zone.
Thereafter, consistency compliance is required for any listed activity
before a federal license or permit may be issued, unless the secretarial
override is brought into play. 0 6 It is apparent that the scope and degree of detail incorporated into the state's list is all-important to state
control over federal license and permit activities. If a state wishes to
receive a consistency determination for an unlisted activity, it may do
so only if the NOAA Assistant Administrator agrees with the state's
contention that the activity is likely to have significant coastal zone impacts. 10 7 On the other hand, if the state's program is meticulous both in
its listing of federal permit activities that will require consistency
certification and in its description of the data and information necessary to assess consistency, 08 the state will be reasonably well assured
that no activities requiring federal licenses or permits will take place
without state concurrence. One simple way of guaranteeing consistency in this context is for the state to require state or local government
agency permits in addition to those required from federal agencies.
The state's management program may then declare that state concurrence will be presumed to have been granted based upon the applicant's receipt of the state permit prior to federal action. 10 9
Although section 307(c)(3)(A) affords the states a limited veto
power, it is qualified in both scope and finality. First, the regulations
exclude from the definition of "applicant" all federal agencies applying
for federal licenses or permits.

10

Numerous state reviewers of the draft

105. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,523-24 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.52).

106. States that have already received federal approval for management programs that do not
contain a license and permit list must amend their programs to add the list. Id. at 10,524 (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.53(d), Comment).
107. Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.54(a)).
108. A state program may describe requirements regarding the data and information necessary to assess the consistency of federal license activities. Id. at 10,525 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.

§ 930.56(b)).
109. This is suggested in the comments to the federal regulations, id. (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. § 930.56(b), Comment). This approach gains added force from President Carter's recent
order to all federal agencies and facilities to obey state and local pollution control standards and

to comply with state procedural regulations, including permit requirements, to the same degree as

any private agency. Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,7707 (1978). To the degree that

federal agencies comply with this mandate, a state may regain some of the "consistency" control it
lost through the federal agency exclusion discussed in text accompanying note 110 infra.
110. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,523-24 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.52).
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regulations strenuously objected to this exclusion, but NOAA has determined that the exemption is "appropriate" based upon the Act and

its legislative history. 1 ' Thus, although federal agency "activities" requiring federal licenses or permits are still subject to the consistency

requirements of section 307(c)(1), it is clear that section 307(c)(3)(A)
does not apply.
Second, the regulations do not allow a state to withdraw its con-

currence once it is given. If a state finds that a permitted activity previously believed to be consistent with its management program is being

conducted incorrectly or is having effects other than as originally proposed, it may request that the appropriate federal agency take remedial
action,1 12 but it has no direct means of voiding a license or permit al-

ready issued. Secretarial mediation is again available in the case of a
continuing disagreement,

but no resolution of the conflict is

guaranteed.
Third, the regulations include "all leases" within the definition of
federal "license or permit" except lease sales on the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS). 113 Senate Bill 586,114 proposed in 1976 to amend the
CZMA, would have added the word "lease" to section 307(c)(3). The

Senate committee report accompanying S. 586 stated that the intent of
the 1972 Act was that federal leases for offshore oil and gas develop-

ment would be within the phrase "licenses or permits"; the new amendment was consequently offered for clarification. 1 5 The Conference

Committee substitute that attained final passage, however, dropped the
term "lease" and instead added a new consistency provision applying
to post-lease production plans. 1 6 There are indications that the confer-

ence report compromised on this issue to avoid the threat of a presidential veto of the entire bill.'

In any event, OCS leases are clearly not

111. Id. at 10,513. NOAA cites nothing in either the Act or its legislative history in support of
this position. It is unlikely, however, that a court would overrule the agency's interpretation of
this point. In light of the Act's disclaimer of any modification of existing laws applicable to federal entities, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(e) (1976), it is difficult to argue that the Act gives the states control
over federal permit issuance to federal agencies. Federal operations are traditionally immune
from state interference, and the Supreme Court has held that a legislative waiver of immunity will
be found only when Congress has expressed such an intent very clearly. See, e.g., Hancock v.
Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
112. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,526 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.66(b)).
113. Id. at 10,523 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.51(a), Comment).
114. S. 586, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).
115. S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1975).
116. Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-370, § 11(2), 90 Stat.
1013 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(b) (1976)).
117. See, ag., 122 CONG. Rnc. SI0,941 (daily ed. June 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
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within the ambit of "license or permit" consistency, and it is not yet
settled whether they are to be deemed federal "activities" subject to the
more general consistency requirements of section 307(c)(l)." 18
Finally, even when a state does not concur that a license or permit
activity will be consistent with its management plan, the Secretary of
Commerce may override the state's objection upon a finding that the
activity is consistent with "the objectives" of CZMA, or "is otherwise
necessary in the interest of national security." 119 The Secretary may
make this finding on his initiative, either before or after the completion
of state review, or upon appeal by a disappointed applicant. 120 The
regulations make it clear, however, that an appeal to the Secretary's
override power is not available when the applicant asserts simply that
the state was incorrect in its declaration of inconsistency; 21 the secretarial review process is intended only in the cases of inconsistent federal
warrant approval "based upon overriding national
actions that
22
concerns." 1

The regulations provide that an inconsistent activity may be found
to be "consistent" with the objectives and purposes of CZMA if four
conditions are met: (a) the activity furthers one or more of the
competing national objectives or purposes contained in section 302
(congressional findings) or 303 (congressional declaration of policy) of
the Act; (b) the activity's total adverse effects on the coastal zone's natural resources "are not substantial enough to outweigh" the activity's
contribution to the national interest; (c) there is no violation of the
Clean Air Act, as amended, or the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, as amended; and (d) no reasonable alternatives are available that
would permit the activity to be conducted in a manner consistent with
118. In the preamble to the previously proposed consistency regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 43,586,
43,591 (1977), NOAA indicated that it was considering a position that would treat pre-lease sale

decisions such as tract selection and choice-of-lease stipulations as federal "activities" subject to
the consistency requirements of § 1456(c)(1). At the same time, the Department of the Interior
was arguing that OCS leasing is not subject to any consistency provision. The controversy continues, and NOAA now states that the issue "will most likely be addressed during Congressional
oversight of the Federal consistency provisions of the Act." 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,512 (1978).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1976). See also id. § 1456(c)(3)(B), (d).
120. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,532 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.132).
121. The Secretary may dismiss an appeal for "good cause," including failure of the appli-

cant/appellant to base the appeal on grounds that the proposed activity is consistent with the
objectives of the Act or is necessary for national security reasons. Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §
930.128).
122. Id. at 10,516.
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the management program.1 23 Override may apply if, after an independent review of comments from the applicant, federal and state
agencies, and the public,124 the Secretary finds that all four requirements are satisfied. It is interesting to note that state reviewers have
argued that the range of discretion afforded the Secretary by these provisions is too broad; industry reviewers have taken a completely oppo125
site position, arguing that the scope of discretion is much too narrow.
NOAA has retained the provision, clearly proposing a procedure by
which the Secretary can have the final word in determining the proper
esthetic values as
balance between "ecological, cultural, historic, and
26
development."'
economic
for
needs
.
.
well as.
For override on the grounds of national security to apply, the Secretary must again conduct an independent study and find the inconsistent activity to be permissible "because a national defense or other
national security interest would be significantly impaired" if the activity is not allowed. National security review is to be "aided" but not
determined by the views submitted by the Department of Defense and
"other interested Federal agencies." 127 The legislative history makes it
clear that the override may not be invoked merely upon a showing by
the Defense Department or other agencies that the activity is "needed"
in the interests of national security; instead, the Secretary should make
all reasonable efforts to reconcile national security demands with the
state's management program.128 Beyond these points, there is nothing
in the regulations or the Act's history to delineate the scope of "national security." The determination appears to be largely within the
discretion of the Secretary. Thus, one of the major concerns of the state
in this regard-the extent to which coastal energy production and
transmission will be considered to override national security interests-will have to await clarification through a case-by-case review.
123. Id. at 10,531 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.12).
124. Public notice of an appeal is required to be provided at a minimum in the immediate

geographical area of the coastal zone likely to be significantly affected by the proposed activity.
Thereafter, "interested persons" may submit comments on the appeal. Id. at 10,532 (to be codi-

fied at 15 C.F.R. § 930.127).
125. Id. at 10,516.
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1976).
127. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,531 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.122).
128. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. 12, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4776, 4793.
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C. Consistencyfor Outer ContinentalShetfActivities: CZMA Section
307(c)(3) (B)
In contrast to the confusion surrounding the consistency status of
OCS leasing, there is no disagreement that consistency compliance is
required with regard to the exploration, development and production
phases of the overall OCS development process. CZMA section
307(c)(3)(B) requires "any person" submitting an OCS exploration or
development plan to the Secretary of the Interior 29 to provide a certification that "each activity which is described in detail" in the plan complies with the state's approved management program. 30 Any "person"
in this case includes federal agencies. 131 As with section 307(c)(3)(A)
license or permit consistency, the state has six months in which to object to the plan; otherwise concurrence is conclusively presumed. If the
state objects, no federal licenses or permits for activities described in
detail in the plan may be issued, unless the plan is amended and accepted by the state, or unless the Secretary of Commerce overrides the
objection on the grounds that each activity is consistent with CZMA
objectives or is necessary in the interest of national security.
Section 307(c)(3)(B) was part of the 1976 amendment package that
was intended in part to facilitate OCS oil and gas development by providing funding and planning assistance to the states to compensate for
energy development impacts in the coastal zone. 132 The provision clarifies the state's authority to participate in federal decisions regarding
OCS exploration and production, 133 but it also expedites the entire
129. Responsibility for overseeing activities on the outer continental shelf is vested in the Department of the Interior by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331-1343 (1970).

130. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1976).
131. The regulations provide that the term "person!' includes "any individual, corporation,

partnership, association, or other entity organized or existing under the laws of any State, the
Federal Government, any State, regional, or local government, or any entity of such Federal,

State, regional, or local government" that submits an OCS plan. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,527
(1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.72). If the definition is read to include federal agencies,

as it appears to do, then it is interesting to note by contrast that "person" as defined in the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331(d) (1970), does not include the federal government
or its agencies. Although federal agencies do not normally engage in OCS exploration or development activities, they are authorized to conduct "geological and geophysical explorations in the
outer Continental Shelf." Id. § 1340.

132. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
133. The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over the resources of the outer continental shelf. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). Nevertheless, many OCS activities are
likely to "significantly affect" a state's coastal zone. Section 307(c)(3)(B) was added specifically to

apply the consistency requirement to "the basic steps in the OCS leasing process--the exploration,
development, and production plans submitted to the Secretary of the Interior." HousE CONFERENCE REP. No. 94-1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1768, 1828.
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OCS consistency determination process. Once a state has concurred

with a plan, or has had its objection overridden by secretarial review,
no further consistency challenge to the many activities conducted pursuant to the plan is possible.'3 4 If the state claims that a previously
approved OCS plan is no longer being followed in a manner consistent

with its management program, it first must appeal for remedial action
by the United States Geological Survey supervisor for the area involved. Only if the state remains unsatisified following a request for
corrective action may it file an objection with the Secretary of Commerce, who in turn makes an independent determination whether the

OCS activities35 are substantially in compliance with the originally approved plan.
It is obvious that the scope of the OCS consistency obligation de-

pends upon the number of federal license or permit activities that must
be "described in detail" in an OCS plan. These are determined by the

Secretary of the Interior, and NOAA's regulations now refer to Interior
Department requirements governing OCS operations.1 36 In addition,

NOAA commentary makes it clear that federal license and permit activities not required by Interior to be described in detail in an OCS
plan are still subject to section 307(c)(3)(A) consistency. 37 It would
seem that to guarantee consistency review under one or the other provisions of section 307(c)(3), the state should be careful to specify in its

management plan those OCS license38and permit activities that will
"significantly affect" its coastal zone.
134. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(ii) (1976). See also House CONFERENCE REP. No. 94-1298,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1768, 1828.
135. If the Secretary finds substantial noncompliance, an amended or new OCS plan must be
submitted along with a new consistency certification. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,529 (1978) (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.86(c)). The state would then have three months within which to concur
or object to the new or amended plan. Id. at 10,528 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.84(c)).
136. Interior Department regulations governing OCS exploration, development, and production operations are to be found in id at 3880 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 250.34). Regulations
pertaining to an OCS information program are at id at 3887 (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 252).
137. Id at 10,510, 10,527 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.71, Comment).
138. The regulations provide that state program lists of § 307(c)(3)(A) license and permit activities "shallinclude a reference to OCS plans which describe in detail Federal license and permit
activities." Id. at 10,526-27 (emphasis added). A state plan should be fairly explicit in its "reference" so that even when a license or permit activity is not required to be detailed in an OCS plan,
and hence is not subject to § 307(c)(3)(B) review, it will still be referenced in the state's program
list and thus automatically subject to § 307(c)(3)(A) consistency requirements. See text accompanying notes 105-09 supra.
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D. Consistencyfor FederalAssistance to State andLocal
Governments: CZMA Section 307(d)
CZMA's final consistency provision 39 prohibits federal agencies
from providing financial assistance for proposed projects to any unit of
a state or local government unless the state agrees that the project is
consistent with its management plan. The regulations indicate that
consistency review of federal assistance activities is to operate in the
same manner as the federal license and permit provisions, with the
state making the initial consistency determination subject to override
by the Secretary. The state should provide in its management plan a
listing of specific types of federal assistance programs subject to consistency review. 140 If the state chooses to review federal assistance activities outside its coastal zone that nevertheless are likely to affect
significantly its coastal area, it must include in the management program a description of the geographic area within which federal assistance applications will be subject to review.' 41 The state may also
monitor for consistency proposed assistance activities outside its coastal
zone or described geographic area; however, its decision to review in
these cases is subject to approval by the NOAA Assistant
Administrator. 142
State review is to be carried out pursuant to the A-95 review process,143 with the state notifying the appropriate clearing house of any
objection it may have to the proposed project. An objection must specifically describe how the project is inconsistent with the state's program and what alternative measures exist to ensure project
consistency. 'I When the state and a federal agency continue to disagree over whether a particular assistance activity is subject to review
(and the Assistant Administrator has not disapproved the state review),
or when there is a serious disagreement about the present consistency
of a federally funded project that was formerly approved, either party
45
may seek secretarial mediation.1
139.
140.
141.
142.

16 U.S.C. § 1456(d) (1976).
43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,529 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.94).
Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.94(b)).
Id. at 10,530 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.98).

143. The term "A-95 process" describes the project notification and review procedures set
forth in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95 (revised) for the evaluation, review and
coordination of federally assisted programs. See 41 Fed. Reg. 2052 (1976).

144. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,530 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 930.36).
145. Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.98-.100).
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The effect of section 307(d) is actually to maximize consistency between a state's management plan and the actions of its own governmental entities, 146 rather than federal agencies. The state has a
qualified veto power that can be exercised through A-95 review to cut
the federal purse strings for a local project. The provision, however,
applies only to applications for federal assistance filed after program
approval by governmental or "related" public entities. Federal assistance activities affecting nongovernmental organizations are still subject
to the milder consistency requirements of section 307(c)(1) and (2).
III.

STATE LAW AND THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

The increasing federal interest and legislative activity affecting
coastal and offshore areas have produced a dramatic rise in the number
of constitutional challenges to state law provisions applicable to coastal
resources. The pervasiveness of federal law has compelled states to reexamine the validity of many rules of common law as well as statutory
enactments under the police power. Increasingly, state law must be tailored to fit within the framework of federal law rules. The issue of
conflict between state and federal law applicable to the coastal zone has
arisen in two principal contexts: property law relating to riparian land
titles and federal preemption of state regulatory measures.
4. State Proper y Law and RiarianLand Title
State law normally has exclusive application to any question regarding rights and interests in land. A series of United States Supreme
Court cases carved out some exceptions to this principle regarding federal grantees, and holders under them, of riparian and littoral lands. In
Hughes v. Washington, 47 the Court held that federal common law governed the right of an ocean front property owner to accreted lands
when the landowner traced title to a federal grant prior to statehood.
The federal rule that the littoral owner gains accretions was applied
rather than the state rule cutting off the right to accretions occurring
after statehood.148 The Court thus guaranteed to federal grantees the
continuing protection of federal law.
146. Id. at 10,529 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.90-.95).
147. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
148. Although the Court held that the question was governed by federal, not state law, Justice
Stewart's concurrence was based principally upon the grounds that the application of state law (as

interpreted by the Washington Supreme Court) in the case at bar would operate to cut off previously vested federal rights and would constitute a compensable taking. Id. at 296-98 (concurring
opinion). In the usual case, however, "it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law of
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This principle was applied in Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,149
which involved a dispute over title to lands that were uncovered by a
narrowing of the channel of the Colorado River. The riparian, a
holder of title under federal grant prior to statehood, claimed these
lands under federal common law, but the state of Arizona maintained
under the doctrine of avulsion that title remained in the state. The
Supreme Court held that the riparian claimant was entitled to the land
under the federal law doctrine of accretion and once again refused to
apply state law to federal grantees of riparian land. 151
In 1977, however, the Supreme Court, in the case of Oregon ex rel.
State Land Board v. CorvallisSand & Gravel Co., 11 reasserted the primacy of state property law and overruled Boneli.1 52 The Court reasoned that the original thirteen colonies held title to lands under their
navigable waters at the time the federal union was created and, under
the equal footing doctrine,1 53 states formed from federal territories
gained title to such lands within their boundaries at the time of their
admission to statehood. The federal common law is only applicable to
fix riparian boundaries at the time of admission, and state law controls
thereafter. Thus, when an avulsive cut converted formerly dry privately owned land into the channel of the Williamette River, the state
rule that sovereign title to a riverbed follows the course of the river
1 54
applied, rather than the federal rule that private title is unaffected.
This is a rejection of the proposition that a preadmission federal grant
embodies vested rights not defeasible by later-created states' rights to
lands under navigable waters.1 5s Federal common law is applicable
real property is, under our Constitution, left to the individual States to develop and administer."

Id. at 295 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also note 155 infra.
149. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
150. Id. at 325-32. Moreover, the Court held that "a right asserted under federal law" must be
determined under federal common law. Id. at 320-25.
151. 429 U.S. 363 (1977).

152. Id. at 382.
153. Set forth in the famous case of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845),

the equal footing doctrine stands for the principle that, as a matter of constitutional law, new
states upon admission to the union have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction within their
respective boundaries as the original thirteen states. The foundation of the doctrine is the tenth
amendment. See, e.g., Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867).

154. 429 U.S. at 372.
155. Constitutional problems arising out of state law defeasance of prestatehood federal property rights may well have been the underlying basis for the Court's earlier decision in Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967). See id. at 295 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Bonelli Cattle

Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. at 337 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting). But the Corvalls interpretation of the
equal footing doctrine would appear to resolve any such problems. By holding that the force of
the equal footing doctrine is spent once a state is admitted to the Union and that thereafter, as a

matter of consitutionbi law, state property law applies in the absence of a compelling federal
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only in the case of a paramount federal interest, as when an interstate
boundary dispute .iinvolved.156
A major uncertainty remaining is the impact of Corvallis on ocean
front lands. The reasoning of the opinion would appear to overrule the
Hughes decision, but the Court declined to take this step. In fact, a
footnote suggests the continuing applicability of the federal common
law rule of riparian proprietorship to ocean front lands because of the
"international sea" margin and the vital interests of the nation in its
own boundaries. 57 This argument would appear to be vulnerable,
however, since the states own the tidelands and the submerged lands of
the continental shelf seaward to the three mile limit. Thus, the statement by the Court that the nation's own boundaries were involved is
factually incorrect. The Hughes doctrine remains, requiring that federal common law govern property rights in the case of changes in the
land-sea margin in those states in which title can be traced to federal
grant prior to admission to statehood, but the underlying logic of the
decision is gone.15 ' It should, therefore, be overruled by the Supreme
Court.
B. FederalPreemption of State Regulatory Laws
In order to analyze the permissible scope of state regulatory legislation, it is helpful to review the basic constitutional principles that
govern the exercise of federalism. The enactment of legislation by
Congress pursuant to its constitutional authority rarely operates in itself to oust state regulatory jurisdiction. 5 9 As a general rule, both the
federal and state governments are permitted to exercise jurisdiction
concurrently over the same subject matters. Instances do exist, however, when state law must retreat because of the presence of federal
authority. Even in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, states
are not permitted through legislation to discriminate against or place a
interest, the Corvallis decision makes it clear that whatever federal rights may have existed prior to

statehood are divested, if at all, by operation of the constitutional equal footing principle rather
than by
156.
157.
158.

state law per se. 429 U.S. at 371, 378.
429 U.S. at 371-72, 381-82; see, eg., Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918).
429 U.S. at 377 n.6.
The Hughes doctrine would not apply to those states that made up the original thirteen

colonies, since there were obviously no federal grants made prior to the existence of the Union. It
was exactly this kind of differentiation between the original states and the subsequently admitted
states that led the Corvallis Court to overrule Boneli. See id. at 378.
159. For preemption to apply, state law must operate in some way "to the contrary" of the
federal legislation, U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2, and the federal legislation itself must have been
passed "in pursuance of" one of the constitutionally delegated powers, cf.Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 128 (1970) ("our national government of enumerated powers").
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16
burden upon interstate commerce. 0

State law is most likely to be declared invalid when Congress has
passed conflicting legislation. Under the supremacy clause 61 of the
United States Constitution, federal law preempts inconsistent state police power measures. Under principles established by the United States
Supreme Court, analysis is necessary on a case-by-case basis to determine the existence of actual conflict when Congress is silent on the
matter. Several indices of conflict are used: (1) whether compliance
with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility; 162 (2)
whether the federal interest is so dominant or pervasive that it precludes state power, 63 or (3) whether state law64 frustrates the legitimate
objectives or purposes of federal legislation.'
Recent cases involving the application of these principles of preemption to coastal resources law indicate that the Supreme Court recognizes the interest of the states in regulating and protecting such
resources and will invalidate state law only when there is a clear frustration of a federal objective. Askew v. American Waterways
Operators165 is notable for rejecting a broad approach to state law preemption. This case involved a challenge to Florida's Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, which imposes strict liability for oil
spill damage to private persons and allows the state to recover clean-up
160. That states may not place an "impermissible" burden upon interstate commerce has been
a settled constitutional doctrine since the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824). Cf.City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S.Ct. 2531 (1978) (banning importation of
out-of-state waste impinges upon protection of commerce clause).
161. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2, provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
162. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
163. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Pennsylvania R. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
164. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501
(1912).
It is apparent that, except in the case of an absolutely clear and irreconcilable conflict be-

tween a state statute and a federal regulatory provision, the typical preemption case necessarily
invokes a certain degree ofjudicial choice concerning the proper degree of state preclusion (ifany)
warranted by the "federal system." This is especially true when the issue is framed in terms of a
"pervasive federal scheme," see, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633

(1973), or the "need for national uniformity," see, eg., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554
(1973). A decision on preemption is a decision on where the line will be drawn in the state/federal

balance of power. For a suggestion that such a balancing analysis by the Supreme Court is part
and parcel of "dynamic federalism," see, Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of
Preemption, 21 DE PAUL L. Rv.630 (1972).
165. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
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costs. A lower court had invalidated this statute on the grounds that it
interfered with the exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court, upholding the state law, stated that federal admiralty
jurisdiction and maritime interests do not per se displace historic state
police power jurisdiction.166 The correct approach is to permit concurrent jurisdiction, and state law must retreat only in the case of actual
conflict with federal law. 6 7
The unlimited and strict liability provisions of the Florida statute
arguably conflicted with provisions of federal law limiting liability for
damages 168 and for clean-up costs incurred by the federal government.' 69 Despite this, the Court preferred to wait until an actual case
arose, stating that "there need be no collision"'7 0 between state and
federal law on the face of the statute. It specifically left open the questions (1) whether state-imposed liability for vessel-source oil spill damage would be limited by federal law, (2) whether recovery by the state
of its clean-up costs would be limited by the federally imposed ceiling
on recovery by the federal government, and (3) whether state require17
ments of specified oil spill containment gear for vessels were invalid.
Interestingly, subsequent cases, taking their cue from Askew, have held
that liability under state law for state-incurred clean-up costs is not limited by federal law; state and federal liability provisions can be reconciled by holding that federal law limits liability merely to the federal
government and states are free to protect their own interests and their
72
citizens by separate recovery of clean-up costs without limitation.
State law regulatory access or use of coastal resources does at
times directly clash with federal law. In Douglas v. SeacoastProducts,
Inc.,1 a Virginia statute that prohibited nonresidents from catching
menhaden in the Virginia portion of Chesapeake Bay was held to be
preempted by the Federal Enrollment and Licensing Act, which was
interpreted to confer the right to perform the activity for which the
vessel was federally enrolled or licensed. Thus the state law could not
166. Id. at 328.
167. Id. at 341.
168. E.g., Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (Supp. V 1975).
169. E.g., Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 102, 84 Stat. 91
(formerly codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162) (amended 1972).
170. 411 U.S. at 336.
171. Id. at 336-37.
172. See, eg., In re Steuart Transp. Co., 435 F. Supp. 798, 806-07 (E.D. Va. 1977), appeal
docketed, Nos. 77-2426, -2427 (4th Cir. July 30, 1977); Portland Pipeline Corp. v. Environmental
Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1, 45 (Me. 1973).
173. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
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discriminate against nonresident owners of federally enrolled vessels. 174 The Court emphasized that this result was based on statutory
considerations, thereby avoiding a constitutional approach based on
would have thrown into question
the need for national uniformity that
175
areas.
regulatory
state law in other
The recent case of Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 176 continues the
Supreme Court's cautious, analytical approach to preemption of state
authority in coastal resource matters. Ray was an action brought by
the Atlantic Richfield Company to challenge several provisions of the
Washington Tanker Law, which regulates the passage of oil tankers on
Puget Sound. Three provisions of the law were involved: (1) a requirement that both enrolled and registered 177 oil tankers of at least 50,000
dead-weight loss tons (DWT) take on a pilot licensed by the State of
Washington; (2) a requirement that enrolled and registered tankers of
from 40,000 to 125,000 DWT possess specified safety features or be
under escort of a tug boat; and (3) a ban on any oil tanker larger than
125,000 DWT from Puget Sound.
To determine the validity of these requirements under federal law,
the Court engaged in close statutory analysis of each separate provision
of the law. The pilotage requirement was declared to be in direct conflict with a federal statute requiring enrolled vessels to be under the
control of pilots licensed by the Coast Guard, but the state was free to
impose the pilotage requirements on registered tankers. 17 8 A similarly
fine distinction was drawn in respect of the Tanker Law's safety requirements. The Court found that because the federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) 17 9 comprehensively regulates

design and construction standards applicable to oil tankers operating in
the navigable waters of the United States, national uniformity man80
dated that Washington not promulgate safety standards of its own.1
On the other hand, the alternative safety requirement of tug escort was
174. Essentially the same situation was involved in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824), which established that the federal licensing of a vessel conferred the right to perform the
licensed activity notwithstanding state regulation. Since the original statutory language construed
in Gibbons had been reenacted unchanged by Congress several times, the Douglas Court concluded that the interpretation of congressional intent in Gibbons was still valid. 431 U.S. at 282.
175. 431 U.S. at 271-72.
176. 98 S. Ct. 988 (1978).
177. "Enrolled" vessels are those engaged in domestic trade or fishing; "registered" vessels are
those engaged in foreign trade. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. at 272-73.
178. 98 S. Ct. at 995.
179. Pub. L. 92-340, § 201, 86 Stat. 424 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (Supp. V 1975)).
180. 98 S. Ct. at 997.
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a permissible local safety measure. The Court rejected the argument
that because the Secretary of Transportation had the authority to deal
with tug escort, the state regulation must fall. State standards, the
Court found, could be enforced until an inconsistent federal rule had
actually been established. The state was also free to enforce reasonable, nondiscriminatory environmental and conservation measures."8 '
Finally, the absolute ban on tankers larger than 125,000 DWT was invalidated on the basis that the Secretary of Transportation had acted to
impose federal size limitations in Puget Sound and Congress did not
intend higher standards to be imposed by the state. The Court also
the need for
cited the legislative history of the PWSA, which stressed 182
national uniformity in tanker design and size limitations.
This jurispndence of the United States Supreme Court involving
the preemption of state police power regulation indicates that states retain a great deal of legislative authority despite the increasing federal
legislative activity in this area. The courts will engage in statutory
analysis to reconcile apparent conflicts, invalidating state law only
when federal law compels a directly contrary result or when1 Congress
83
has unmistakably called for national uniformity in a matter.
CONCLUSION

Despite the flood of federal legislative activity concerning coastal
and offshore resources, the individual states have adequate legal authority to formulate and maintain the management policies they choose
to apply in their coastal areas. Three independent but related models
exist for the exercise of state authority in conjunction with federal action. First, the federal government has granted the states wide powers
over resources in the territorial sea and has provided mechanisms for
shared decisionmaking even in offshore areas under federal control.
Second, the consistency requirements of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act give the states concrete, although incomplete, power over
federal actions. The machinery implementing these requirements is
complicated and many important concepts are only vaguely defined,
but there are now important limitations on the freedom of action of
181. Id, quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. at 277.
182. 98 S. Ct. at 1003.

183. Cf. California v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2985 (1978) (states may impose conditions on
irrigation permits granted to federal authorities if such conditions are not inconsistent with congressional provisions authorizing project in question); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S.

Ct. 2531 (1978) (federal waste disposal legislation does not clearly preempt state authority in
field).
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federal agency officials preventing them from arbitrarily ignoring state
policies. To take full advantage of this new power, a state should actively formulate and define its own coastal management program under
state law. Third, recent decisions indicate that states can continue to
address property and police power issues concerning the management
of coastal and marine resources even when federal law applies. State
law will not be preempted absent direct conflict with federal legislation.
States will continue to play the dominant role in determining the
future of their coastal and offshore areas. They should realize, however, that this dominant role will not be theirs automatically, but will
depend on their vigorous and active participation in the process of resource management and upon their willingness to understand and use
the new legal tools available to them.

